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INTRODUCTION: INTEREST ANALYSIS AND JUDICIAL METHOD
In my many years of writing about the conflict of laws, I
have focused on essentially two themes. On the one hand, I am
a strong proponent of interest analysis as the preferred ap-
proach to choice of law. I maintain that interest analysis is the
preferred approach because it provides functionally sound and
fair solutions to the choice-of-law issues arising in actual cases.
Interest analysis simplifies the choice-of-law process by focus-
ing on what the courts consider to be the most rational consid-
erations in making choice-of-law decisions: the policies re-
flected in a state's rule of substantive law and a state's interest
in applying its law in order to implement those policies in a
particular case.' Furthermore, I have demonstrated that in
8 1 N.Y.2d 66, 612 N.E.2d 277, 595 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1993).
Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., 1956, J.D., 1959, University
of Pittsburgh.
' See generally Robert A. Sedler, Professor Juenger's Challenge to the Interest
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practice, all the courts that have abandoned the traditional
approach to choice of law2 generally reach results that are
consistent with the results that would be reached under the
interest analysis approach, regardless of which "modern" ap-
proach to choice of law they are purportedly following.3
On the other hand, I have also emphasized judicial method
in conflicts cases. I have distinguished between the function of
a court in a conflicts case and the use of the interest analysis
approach by the court in performing that function. I relate the
function of a court in a conflicts case to what I see to be the
general purpose of conflicts law: providing functionally sound
and fair solutions for the relatively few cases that arise in prac-
tice for which a court has to make a choice-of-law decision.4
Therefore, the court's focus in a conflicts case should be on the
precise choice-of-law issue presented for decision in the case
before it, and the court's objective should be to resolve that
issue in such a way that will produce a functionally sound and
fair result.
Some years ago, I analyzed the choice-of-law process in
terms of judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of
laws.5 I maintain that, in accordance with the common law
tradition, courts should apply judicial method to the resolution
Analysis Approach to Choice-of-Law: An Appreciation and a Response, 23 U.C.
DAvIs L. REV. 865 (1990) [hereinafter Sedler, Juenger's Challenge]; Robert A.
Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response
to the "New Critics," 34 MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983) [hereinafter Sedler, New Crit-
ics]; Robert A. Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of Law: An
Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REV. 181 (1977) [hereinafter Sedler,
Governmental Interest Approach].
2 The traditional rule in tort cases was lex loci delicti (law of the place of the
wrong).
' See Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 1, at 190-220; Sedler,
New Critics, supra note 1, at 635-43.
' For a discussion of why relatively few conflicts cases arise in practice, see
Sedler, New Critics, supra note 1, at 597-98.
' Robert A. Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the
Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws, 56 KY. L.J. 27 (1967) [hereinafter Sedler, Judicial
Method]; Robert A. Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan: Judicial Method and the
Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1193 (1985); Robert A. Sedler,
Judicial Method is "Alive and Well": The Kentucky Approach to Choice of Law in
Interstate Accident Cases, 61 KY. L.J. 378 (1973) [hereinafter Sedler, The Kentucky
Approach]. Other writings developing this thesis include Robert A. Sedler, Charac-
terization, Identification of the Problem Area and the Policy-Centered Conflict of
Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, 2 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 8 (1970).
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of conflicts problems, as they apply it in other areas of law.6
Under judicial method, a court should render the choice-of-law
decision with reference to the fact-law pattern presented in the
particular case. The decision in that case would serve as a
precedent for decisions in other cases presenting the same fact-
law pattern, and the decision's rationale would serve as a
guide to the resolution of future cases presenting different fact-
law patterns. In time, depending on the number and kinds of
cases that arose in each state, a body of conflicts law would
emerge in that state through the normal workings of binding
precedent and stare decisis.7
Furthermore, the criteria for the choice-of-law decision
should be based upon considerations of policy and fairness to
the parties. The rationale here is that the criteria for the
choice-of-law decision-the decision to displace the forum's own
law and to look to the law of another state, in whole or in part,
for the rule of decision in the case-should relate to the under-
lying justification for such displacement. Under the "criteria-
justification" rationale, the forum's law should be displaced in
a particular case only when either policy considerations, such
as recognition of the legitimate interest of another state in
having its law applied,8 or a concern for fairness, such as pro-
tecting the reasonable expectations of the parties, dictate the
displacement of the forum's law in favor of another state's law.
In the absence of such considerations, the law of the forum
should apply, just as it would in a purely domestic case.
Under a judicial method and policy-centered conflict of
laws approach, then, the choice-of-law process would operate in
accordance with the following premises: (1) the basic law is the
law of the forum, which will be applied in the absence of valid
reasons for its displacement;9 (2) the choice-of-law decision
6 Sedler, Judicial Method, supra note 5, at 42-45, 57-58.
7 Id. at 82-87.
' An example of such a situation, using the interest analysis approach, is the
"false conflict" brought in the disinterested state. Since the forum does not have a
real interest in having its law applied in order to implement the policy reflected
in that law, while the other state does, the forum should apply the law of the
only interested state. In practice, this is the most common situation where the
forum will displace its own law. See Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra
note 1, at 186-87, 222-27.
' As to the reasons why the law of the forum is the basic law, see BRAINERD
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 75-76 (1963); Sedler, Judicial
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will be made with reference to the fact-law pattern presented
in the particular case; and (3) the choice-of-law decision will be
based on considerations of policy and fairness to the parties.1"
In Part I, I begin by discussing what I have called "rules of
choice of law." Here I will emphasize the ninth "rule of choice
of law," which the New York Court of Appeals effectively ap-
plied in its 1993 decision, Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc. In
Part II, I next discuss the Cooney decision itself and relate it to
the operation of the ninth "rule of choice of law." Finally, in
Part III of this Article, I will raise a question about the contin-
ued viability of the Neumeier rules in New York in light of the
Court of Appeals' treatment of them in Cooney.
I. "RULES OF CHOICE OF LAW"
The operation of judicial method in practice will lead to
the development of what I have called "rules of choice of law."
I have demonstrated that in the torts area, at least, there are
in fact "rules of choice of law" that have emerged from the
practice of the courts in deciding the conflicts torts cases that
have come before them.1 I distinguish these "rules of choice
of law" from choice-of-law rules, including both the broad,
state-selecting rules of the traditional approach, and narrow,
policy-based choice-of-law rules, such as the "Neumeier rules,"
which the New York Court of Appeals established in 1972.12
Choice-of-law rules are formulated a priori and then applied to
the facts of a particular case. 3
Method, supra note 5, at 87-95.
" For a discussion of the operation of judicial method in one state, Michigan,
see Robert A. Sedler, Continuity, Precedent and Choice of Law: A Reflective Re-
sponse to Professor Hill, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1419, 1429-37 (1992).
"1 Robert A. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judi-
cial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 975 (1977).
12 Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 33 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1972). Under the first Neumeier rule, where the parties are from the same state,
the law of their home state applies. Under the second and third Neumeier rules,
where the parties are from different states, the law of the state where the acci-
dent occurs generally applies. See generally Robert A. Sedler, Interstate Accidents
and the Unprovided For Case: Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 125, 130-37 (1973), for my discussion of the Neumeier rules.
1 Any "precedential effect" of a case in which a court has simply applied a
choice-of-law rule is dubious, since the court's decision was made neither indepen-
dently of the rule nor with reference to the precise choice-of-law issue presented in
1326 [Vol. 59: 1323
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A "rule of choice of law," by contrast, emerges from the
decisions of the courts in the actual cases coming before them
for decision. Thus, the "rule of choice of law" may be consid-
ered a true precedent. I should add, however, that the tort
"rules of choice of law" that I have identified are based solely
on the results of the decided cases. They are not based on the
courts' explanations for their decisions in these cases or on the
application of the particular choice-of-law approach that the
courts are purportedly applying. And the courts generally do
not refer to "rules of choice of law" as such. 4 Nonetheless, it
does seem very significant that, at least in the torts area, all
the courts that have abandoned the traditional, lex loci delicti
approach have reached fairly uniform solutions in the different
fact-law patterns presented to them for decision. When the
courts have differed, the differences are sufficiently clear as to
indicate "majority" and "minority" views, as in other areas of
law.
There are several reasons for this uniformity. First, the
fact-law patterns in conflicts torts cases are easy to identify.
The fact part of the fact-law pattern relates to the states where
the parties reside, the state where the harm occurred and, if it
differs, the state where the act or omission causing the harm
took place. The law part relates to whether the law in question
allows or denies recovery, whether it reflects an admonitory or
compensatory policy or both, and whether it involves other
considerations, such as those applicable to workers' compen-
sation. Thus, a case may present a fact-law pattern of an inju-
ry in a non-recovery state involving two parties from a recov-
ery state, an injury in a recovery state involving two parties
from a non-recovery state, or an injury in either a recovery or
a non-recovery state involving parties from different recovery
.or non-recovery states. A case may also involve a law reflecting
the particular case. Thus, when courts abandoned the traditional approach to
choice of law, as the New York Court of Appeals did in Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), the cours prior decisions
that were based on the traditional approach necessarily lost their precedential
effect.
"4 But see Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, 320 N.W.2d 843, 851 (Mich. 1982)
(referring to the "most universal rule of choice of law:" when two residents of the
forum are involved in an accident in another state, the law of the forum applies)
(quoting Robert A. Sedler, Choice of Law in Michigan: A Time to Go Modern, 24
WAYNE L. REV. 829, 849 (1978)).
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an admonitory policy, which may give rise to a different inter-
est mix than would be present in the same fact-law pattern if
the law reflected only a compensatory policy.
The use of interest analysis by the courts in practice has
also contributed to fairly uniform solutions in the fact-law
patterns of conflicts torts cases. Contrary to the contentions of
many critics of interest analysis, in actual cases the policies
and interests of the involved states are not at all difficult to
identify. 5 In the ordinary accident case, the states primarily
interested in applying their respective laws are the parties'
home states where the consequences of the accident and of
imposing or denying liability will be felt by the parties and
their insurers. Where the law of the plaintiff's home state
allows recovery, that state is interested in applying its own law
to allow recovery to the resident plaintiff irrespective of where
the accident occurs or where the defendant resides. Similarly,
where the law of the defendant's home state denies recovery,
that state is interested in applying its law to deny recovery,
again irrespective of where the accident occurs or where the
victim resides. Conversely, the state where the accident occurs
has no interest in applying its law to deny recovery to a non-
resident injured there and, in my opinion, no real interest in
applying its law to allow recovery to a non-resident injured
there. 6 Finally, when a state's law reflects an admonitory or
regulatory policy, its interest in applying its law in order to
implement that policy is not predicated on its connection with
any party, but rather on its connection with the conduct sought
to be deterred or the activity sought to be regulated.
Fairness to the parties is an independent choice of law
consideration. Even though a state may have a real interest in
applying its own law in order to implement the policy reflected
in that law, that state will not and, as a matter of due process,
cannot constitutionally apply its own law where the application
of that law would be fundamentally unfair to the other par-
ty.17 Moreover, a state is reluctant to apply its own law, de-
15 See Sedler, Juenger's Challenge, supra note 1, at 880-84; Sedler, New Critics,
supra note 1, at 617-20; Sedler, Governmental Interest Approach, supra note 1, at
194-204.
16 See Sedler, The Kentucky Approach, supra note 5, at 382-83.
17 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), and the discussion in
Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective of
[Vol. 59:1323
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spite a real interest in doing so, where the application of its
law may produce some unfairness to the party against whom it
is being applied, although the degree of unfairness may not
rise to constitutional dimensions. In the tort area, fairness
relates to foreseeability and reliance. The application of a
state's law may produce unfairness if the party against whom
that state's law is sought to be applied could not foresee the
application of that law at the time the party acted and, in the
circumstances presented, the party was entitled to rely on the
law of another state and conform its conduct to the require-
ment of that states' laws. 8 Although such cases will be fairly
rare, they do occur, and when they do, the forum will displace
its own law despite a real interest in having that law applied. 9
Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 85-92 (1981).
" Thus, there is no unfairness in applying the law of the victim's home state
to allow recovery against a non-resident defendant for an accident occurring in the
defendant's home state if, with respect to the matter in issue, the defendant did
not rely on the law of its home state and conform its conduct to the requirements
of that law. In Schwartz v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 221 N.W.2d 665 (Minn.
1974), a Minnesota resident was involved in an accident with a truck driven by
Consolidated's employee in Ohio, Consolidated's home state. Ohio law at that time
made contributory negligence a complete bar to recovery. Minnesota was a compar-
ative negligence state. In a suit in Minnesota, where Consolidated was subject to
general jurisdiction on the basis of doing substantial business, Minnesota applied
its own law on the issue of contributory fault. Id. at 668. This case, of course,
presented a true conflict and, as is usual, Minnesota applied its own law in order
to implement the policy reflected in that law. Id. There was no unfairness in
Minnesota's doing so. While the application of Minnesota law on this issue was
not foreseeable, since the accident occurred in Ohio, there was no reliance on the
Ohio contributory negligence rule by Consolidated's driver-the driver did not de-
liberately become involved in an accident with the Minnesota driver on the theory
that the Minnesota driver would be barred by contributory negligence from recov-
ering for the accident.
" I consider Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal.
1978), to be such a case. In that case, a "key employee" of Offshore, a California
corporation, was injured while at Continental's facilities in Louisiana. Offshore
claimed that California law would impose tort liability against Continental for
causing the loss of its "key employee." Id. This kind of liability was not imposed
under Louisiana law or under the law of any other state. The California court
assumed for purposes of this case that California law did impose such liability (it
later held in a purely domestic case that it did not, see I.J. Weinrot & Sons, Inc.
v. Jackson, 708 P.2d 682 (Cal. 1985)), so that for purposes of interest analysis,
there was a true conflict. California purportedly resolves true conflicts by the use
of comparative impairment. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719
(Cal.) (Nevada gambling casino located across state line in Nevada advertised
heavily in California, and California victim was injured in California in accident
caused by one of casino's intoxicated patrons; California law imposing dram shop
act liability applied instead of Nevada law which would not impose liability, since
1329
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California's interest would be "significantly impaired" if its law were not applied to
impose liability against Nevada gambling casino that advertised heavily in Califor-
nia), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976). In Offshore, the California court held that
Louisiana's interest would be "more impaired if its law were not applied" in this
case. 583 P.2d at 720. In arriving at this conclusion, the court emphasized that
Continental had to deal with employees from many different states at its Loui-
siana facility, and that it would most reasonably have anticipated a need for pro-
tection of premises liability insurance based on Louisiana law, under which it
could not incur tort liability for economic injury to the victim's employer. Id. at
728-29.
I think that the California court would have reached the same result even if
there were a California statute specifically imposing tort liability for the loss of a
"key employee." In that circumstance, California law would be imposing a very
special kind of tort liability that did not exist under Louisiana law. The injury
occurred on Continental's premises in Louisiana. Id. at 723. Since, as the court
recognized in Offshore, Continental had to deal with employees from many differ-
ent states, it would most reasonably have anticipated a need for the protection of
premises liability insurance based on Louisiana law. Since liability is sought to be
imposed against Continental solely for harm occurring on its premises in Louisi-
ana, Continental was justifiably entitled to rely on Louisiana law and to conform
its conduct and insurance protection to the requirements of Louisiana law. In this
case, then, fairness considerations would dictate application of Louisiana law on
the issue of tort liability for the loss of a "key employee" despite California's inter-
est in applying its law imposing liability for the benefit of the California plaintiff.
In a similar vein is Barrett v. Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir.
1971) (applying New Hampshire law). In that case, a New Hampshire employee of
a New Hampshire contractor suffered serious injuries while working on an electri-
cal transformer in Massachusetts and brought suit in a federal court in New
Hampshire against the New Hampshire landowner. Id. at 1148. The landowner
would not be liable under Massachusetts law, under which the only duty imposed
on a landowner in these circumstances was to warn of hidden dangers. Id. at
1149. The plaintiff contended the New Hampshire law imposed a higher duty of
care. Id. The court held that Massachusetts law applied on the duty of care owed
by landowners to persons on the land, emphasizing that the Massachusetts land-
owner was entitled to rely on the Massachusetts standard of care when acting on
its Massachusetts land. Id. at 1154.
Still another "fairness" case is Blakesley v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236 (3d Cir.
1986) (applying Pennsylvania law), in which a Pennsylvania resident was advised
by her physician to have a complicated procedure performed by a Texas oral sur-
geon. The Texas oral surgeon met with the plaintiff when he was visiting in
Pennsylvania, and arranged to perform the procedure at a hospital in Texas. Id.
at 237. The operation was unsuccessful and, in fact, caused additional injury to
the plaintiff. Id. In a malpractice action against the oral surgeon in Pennsylvania
(the oral surgeon made no objection to Pennsylvania's exercise of jurisdiction, al-
though such an objection might have been sustained), the court held that Texas
law, which was more favorable to the defendant, applied on the issues of "in-
formed consent" and limitations on malpractice damages. Id. at 243. The court
emphasized that the plaintiff voluntarily went to Texas to have the procedure
performed and, accordingly, the defendant was entitled to rely on the Texas law of
'informed consent" and limited liability for damages. Id.
A final "fairness" case is Bader v. Purdom, 841 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1988) (ap-
[Vol. 59: 1323
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I have identified several tort "rules of choice of law." They
illustrate the operation of judicial method and the policy-cen-
tered conflict of laws approach in the tort area.2" The first and
most "universal" "rule of choice of law," followed by all of the
courts that have abandoned the traditional, lex loci delicti ap-
proach, is that when two residents of the forum are involved in
an accident in another state, the law of the forum applies.
When the law of the forum allows recovery, the forum is inter-
ested in applying that law for the benefit of its resident plain-
tiff, and when the law of the forum denies recovery, the forum
is interested in applying that law for the benefit of the resident
defendant. Thus, the forum will apply its own law in this situ-
ation notwithstanding that the accident occurred in another
state.21 The second and also universally followed "rule of
choice of law" is that when two parties from a recovery state
are involved in an accident in a non-recovery state, recovery
will be allowed. This is the classic false conflict, whether both
parties are from the same or from different recovery states.
Recovery will be allowed regardless of where suit is brought.2
The third "rule of choice of law" covers the situation where
two parties from a non-recovery state are involved in an acci-
dent in a recovery state. Here, suit will be brought in the re-
covery state, since if it is brought in the non-recovery state,
plying New York law), which involved the application of New York's Neumeier
rules. When New York parents were visiting friends in Ontario, they left their
small child unsupervised, and the child was injured by the friends' dog. Id. They
brought a negligence action on behalf of the child in New York. Realistically, of
course, the suit was against their friends' homeowners' insurer, and the insurer
sought to recover contribution and indemnity from the allegedly negligent parents,
which was permitted under Ontario law, but not under New York law. The court
characterized this case as a true conflict and looked to Ontario law under the
second Neumeier rule. Id. at 40. Here, it can be contended that the application of
New York law on the issue of contribution and indemnity would have been unfair
to the dog owners, the nominal defendants in the case. Since they were acting in
Ontario, they were entitled to conform their conduct to the requirements of Ontar-
io law, under which the parents were responsible for the child's protection. Thus,
they would not have to be concerned about the child's safety while the parents
were present.
2 The seventh "rule of choice of law" deals with the situation of a law that
reflects an admonitory or regulatory policy. The other "rules of choice of law" are
predicated on the assumption that the laws in issue reflect only compensatory
policies.
21 See Sedler, supra note 11, at 1033-34.
See id. at 1034.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
that court will apply the first "rule of choice of law," and recov-
ery will be denied. The plaintiff, however, can always bring
suit in the recovery state, obtaining jurisdiction under its long-
arm act. Here, the courts are divided, with the majority of the
courts allowing recovery. 3 As discussed previously, in this sit-
uation I do not think that the recovery state has any real in-
terest in applying its law, but the courts that do allow recovery
here emphasize the forum's "better law" and the even-handed
treatment of non-residents injured in the forum.24
The fourth "rule of choice of law" covers the true conflict,
where the accident occurs in the plaintiffs home state, either
because of an act done there, as in the ordinary automobile
accident case, or because of an act done elsewhere that has
created a foreseeable risk of harm in the forum and in fact has
caused such harm.2 ' Here, the plaintiff will sue in the home
state, and in this true conflict situation, the forum will apply
its own law allowing recovery.26
The fifth and sixth "rules of choice of law" cover the true
conflict where the accident occurs in the defendant's home
state, and indicate that the result will usually depend on
whether suit can be brought in the plaintiffs home state. Fre-
quently, jurisdiction can be obtained in the plaintiffs home
state, either because the defendant is a corporation doing sub-
stantial business there, 7 or because the underlying accident
had substantial factual contacts with the plaintiff's home
state," or even because the defendant is personally served in
the plaintiff's home state. In this situation, the forum will
See id. at 1035.
24 See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 200 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973).
25 The latter situation is illustrated by a case such as Bernhard v. Harrah's
Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976). Since the casino ad-
vertised extensively in California, it was subject to long-arm jurisdiction there,
and, as pointed out previously, California applied its law imposing dram shop act
liability. See supra note 19.
2 See Sedler, supra note 11, at 1035-36.
217 See, e.g., Schwartz v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 221 N.W.2d 665 (Minn.
1974), in which the defendant was an interstate trucking company doing substan-
tial business in Minnesota. It was sued there in a case arising from an accident
in Ohio involving one of its vehicles and a Minnesota victim. Id. at 665.
28 See, e.g., Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972), in which
the defendant was a resident of Ohio, but worked in Kentucky, and the parties
went on a day trip from Kentucky to Ohio, intending to return to Kentucky that
evening. The accident occurred while the parties were in Ohio. Id. at 828.
"' See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1970), in which the plaintiff, a
1332 [Vol. 59:1323
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almost always apply its own law allowing recovery." If, how-
ever, suit is brought in the defendant's home state, that state
will always apply its own law denying recovery.3 '
The seventh "rule of choice of law" is that where the law of
the state in which an act or omission occurs reflects an admon-
itory or regulatory policy, the defendant will be held liable
even if that act or omission causes harm in another state.
Here, the state where the act or omission occurs has a real
interest in applying its law in order to implement the admoni-
tory or regulatory policy reflected in that law, and ordinarily
the state in which the harm occurs will have no interest in
insulating the actor from liability.
32
The eighth "rule of choice of law" deals with what in terms
of interest analysis is the unprovided-for case: the plaintiff is
from a non-recovery state and the defendant is from a recovery
state. In this situation, recovery usually will be allowed irre-
spective of where the accident occurs, although under New
York's "Neumeier" rules, recovery will be denied if the accident
occurs in the victim's home state.3
It is the ninth "rule of choice of law" that the New York
Court of Appeals effectively applied in Cooney. This "rule of
choice of law" is that the tort liability of an employer to an
employee who is covered by workers' compensation or liability
to a third-party for contribution resulting from a work-related
injury is determined by the law of the state where the employ-
er has taken out workers' compensation to cover the particular
employee. 4 In commenting on this "rule of choice of law" in
1977, I stated that:
This rule of choice of law is as "universal" as the rule that the state
of the parties' common residence will apply its own law to an acci-
dent involving those parties in another state. It illustrates the situa-
Pennsylvania resident, and the nominal defendant, a Delaware resident, were
friends, and the suit arose out of an automobile accident occurring while the par-
ties were traveling in Delaware. The defendant was served while he and the
plaintiff were playing golf together in Pennsylvania.
See Sedler, supra note 11, at 1036-37.
See id. at 1038.
22 See id.
See id. at 1038-39.
24 See id. at 1039. The rule as formulated here referred only to the employer's
liability to the employee, but the cases on which it was predicated included the
matter of liability to a third-party for contribution.
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tion in which the courts have agreed that only one state has a real
interest in applying its law on the point in issue. The policy of all
states relating to workers' compensation recovery and considerations
of fairness to the employer are best served by looking to the law of
the state in which the employer has taken out workers' compensa-
tion to cover the particular employee.35
In commenting on this "rule of choice of law" some years later,
I made the following additional observations:
The reason for this result is that the policy behind the law of
workers' compensation is that workers' compensation should be the
primary means of providing compensation for work-related injuries,
and it will be the exceptional case where an employee covered by
workers' compensation is able to maintain a tort action as well.
Since the injured employee is entitled to receive workers' compensa-
tion payments, the employee's subsistence needs will be met, and
the policy behind the workers' compensation law of the employee's
home state will have been satisfied. Moreover, the employer is con-
sidered to be entitled to rely on the law of the state where workers'
compensation, covering the particular employee, was taken out to
immunize it from tort liability to that employee."
As between employer and employee, the cases typically
have involved the interstate sub-contracting situation, where
one of the contractors is not required to take out workers' com-
pensation insurance covering the particular employee under
the workers' compensation law of one of the states, and so
remains liable to the employee in a common law tort action
under the law of that state. The employee who has received
workers' compensation from one of the contractors then brings
a tort action against the other contractor, who remains liable
in a tort action under the law of one of the states. The "classic"
case presenting this situation is Wilson v. Faull.37 In Wilson
the plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, whose immediate employ-
er was the New Jersey sub-contractor, was sent to work on a
site in Pennsylvania, where he was injured. The general con-
tractor was required to carry workers' compensation covering
the injured worker under Pennsylvania's workers' compensa-
tion law and did so. It was not required to carry workers' com-
pensation insurance covering employees of sub-contractors
" Id. at 1040.
' ROBERT A. SEDLER, ACROSS STATE LINES: APPLYING THE CONFLICT OF LAwS
TO YOUR PRACTICE 62 (1989).
37 141 A.2d 768 (N.J. 1958).
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under New Jersey law, and so remained liable to them in a
common law tort action. After the accident, the plaintiff ob-
tained workers' compensation from his New Jersey employer
and then sought to maintain a tort action against the Pennsyl-
vania general contractor in New Jersey. Emphasizing that the
Pennsylvania general contractor was entitled to rely on Penn-
sylvania law immunizing it from tort liability, the New Jersey
court held that suit would be barred notwithstanding New
Jersey's interest in applying its law in order to allow greater
recovery to the New Jersey employee.3 ' Numerous other cases
presenting this situation have reached the same result.39 By
" Id. at 779. The result in Wilson v. Faull was reaffirmed by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Eger v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours Co., 539 A.2d 1213 (N.J. 1988).
The court there noted that the decision in Wilson v. Faull "foreshadowed, if it did
not fully comport with, contemporary choice-of-law doctrine in which the determi-
native law is that of the state with the greatest interest in governing the particu-
lar issue." Id. at 1216.
" See, e.g., Durate v. McKenzie Constr. Co., 152 Cal. Rptr. 373 (App. Div.
1979); Kabak v. Thor Power Tool Co., 245 N.E.2d 596 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969); Busby
v. Perini Corp., 290 A.2d 210 (R.I. 1972); Osborn v. Kinnington, 787 S.W.2d 417
(Tex. Civ. App. 1990); Wheeler v. Parker Drilling Co., 803 P.2d 1379 (Wyo. 1991).
States that still follow the traditional, lex loci delicti rule also reach this result, in
that they will look to the law of the state where the employer has taken out
workers' compensation to cover the particular employee rather than the law of the
state where the accident occurred to determine the employee's entitlement to
maintain a tort action. Hauch v. Connor, 453 A.2d 1207 (Md. 1983). Sometimes, as
in Hauch v. Connor, Lutz v. DeMars, 559 N.E.2d 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), and
Garcia v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 841 F.2d 1062 (11th Cir. 1988)
(applying Florida law), this "rule of choice of law" will result in the application of
the law of the forum on this issue.
An interesting variation of this situation was presented in Paulo v. Benex
Corp., 792 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying California law). The plaintiff was a
resident of Ontario, Canada, who suffered a work-related injury there when he
slipped into a meat grinder. Id. After receiving workers' compensation from his
Ontario employer, he brought a products liability action against the manufacturer
of the meat grinder in California, where it had been manufactured. The manufac-
turer, however, was also doing business in Ontario, and was subject to Ontario
workers' compensation law. That law barred a tort action against any employer
who was covered by the law, even if that employer was not the victim's employer.
Id. at 895. Since the manufacturer was immune from a tort action under Ontario
law, the court held that Ontario law applied and barred the suit.
This "rule of choice of law" is in effect embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 184 (1971). The comment to this section states:
It is thought unfair that a person who is required to provide insurance
against a risk under the workmen's compensation statute of one state
which gives him immunity from liability for tort or wrongful death
should not enjoy that immunity in a suit brought in other states. Also to
deny a person the immunity granted him by a workmen's compensation
1335
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the same token, the law of the state where the employer has
taken out workers' compensation to cover the particular em-
ployee also determines whether the employee can maintain an
action against a co-employee for a work-related injury, since
the employer ultimately will be liable for the negligence of the
co-employee.40
Whenever the employee is able to maintain a tort action
against a third-party, such as the driver of the other vehicle in
a work-related accident or, more typically, against the manu-
facturer of the product causing the work-related injury, the
third-party tortfeasor will try to obtain contribution from the
employer, alleging that the employer's negligence contributed
to the injury. As Cooney indicates, the states differ consider-
statute of a given state would frustrate the efforts of that state to re-
strict the cost of industrial accidents and to afford a fair basis for pre-
dicting what those costs will be. All states are sympathetic with the poli-
cies underlying workmen's compensation, and all states grant certain
persons immunity from liability for tort or wrongful death, although the
provisions of the various statutes do differ in matters of detail. For all of
these reasons, a state will not hold a person liable for tort or wrongful
death under the circumstances stated in the present rule.
This "rule of choice of law" does not apply for the benefit of an employer who,
although required under the law of the forum, failed to take out workers' com-
pensation insurance to cover the particular employee. Since the sanction for non-
compliance is tort liability, in that circumstance, the forum will apply its own
workers' compensation law and hold the non-complying employer to tort liability.
See, e.g., Reid v. Hansen, 440 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 1989); see also Davis v. Morrison-
Knudsen Co., 289 F. Supp. 835 (D. Or. 1968) (applying Oregon law), in which the
employer elected not to come under the Oregon workers' compensation law, and so
remained liable in a common law tort action. The particular employee worked in
both Oregon and Idaho, and received recovery under the Idaho workers' compensa-
tion law for the injury occurring there. The court held that because of the
employer's election not to come under the Oregon workers' compensation law, it
would be subject to a common law tort action in Oregon. Id. at 838.
4" See, e.g., Saharceski v. Marcure, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (Mass. 1977); LaBounty v.
American Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 161 (N.H. 1982); Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 204
N.W.2d 897 (Wis. 1973).
The law of the state where the employer has taken out workers' compen-
sation insurance to cover the particular employee also determines the employer's
subrogation rights in the employee's tort recovery against the third-party
tortfeasor. See, e.g., Brown v. Globe Union, A Division of Johnson Controls, Inc.,
694 F. Supp. 795 (D. Colo. 1988) (applying Colorado law); Perry v. Carter, 620
S.W.2d 50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Breslin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 391 A.2d 342
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1975), affd, 354 A.2d 635 (N.J. 1976); Allen v. American Hard-
woods & Saif, 795 P.2d 592 (Or. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 800 P.2d 789 (Or.
1990); Davish v. Gidley, 611 A.2d 1307 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 185 (1971).
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ably on the question of whether the employer is liable for con-
tribution to the third-party tortfeasor. States like New York
that allow contribution against the employer to the third-party
tortfeasor clearly have an interest in applying their law allow-
ing contribution for the benefit of the resident defendant, while
the employer's home state has a similar interest in immuniz-
ing the employer from contribution. In terms of interest analy-
sis, this situation presents the true conflict.4 '
However, when cases presenting this issue have arisen,
the courts have generally drawn an analogy to the cases where
the employee was seeking tort recovery against the non-cov-
ered employer, and have held that the law of the state where
the employer has taken out workers' compensation to cover the
particular employee determines the employer's liability for
contribution to the third-party tortfeasor. Here, the "classic"
case is Elston v. Industrial Life & Truck Co.42 In that case, a
Pennsylvania resident working in New Jersey was injured
there while operating a fork-lift truck purchased from a Penn-
sylvania manufacturer. He obtained workers' compensation
benefits from his employer under the New Jersey workers'
compensation act, and then brought a products liability action
against the Pennsylvania manufacturer in Pennsylvania. The
manufacturer sought to join the employer as a third-party
defendant in order to obtain contribution, which was not per-
mitted by New Jersey law, but was permitted by Pennsylvania
law. Despite Pennsylvania's interest in applying its law to
enable the Pennsylvania manufacturer to obtain contribution
against the New Jersey employer, the Pennsylvania court held
that New Jersey law applied on this issue. As the court stated:
Were Industrial [the manufacturer] to prevail, the Pennsylvania
policy of permitting contribution would be imposed upon the New
Jersey program of workmen's compensation. Pennsylvania, thus,
would inteiject a limitation on the manner by which New Jersey
could determine to meet the social costs of its industrial accidents.
Such an approach, in our view, would be unsound. The extent to
which the New Jersey program of workmen's compensation should
assimilate the equities underlying contribution is a determination
41 See Cooney v. Osgood Mach. Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 66, 74, 612 N.E.2d 277, 282-83,
595 N.Y.S.2d 919, 923-24 (1993).
42 216 A.2d 318 (Pa. 1966).
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more appropriately to be made by that state.43
In the same vein is Vickrey v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,44
where the facts were identical to those in Cooney,45 even to
the point that the employer was from Missouri. The Illinois
court applied Missouri law, immunizing the employer from
liability for contribution to the Illinois manufacturer. It spe-
cifically drew an analogy to its decision in an earlier case,
Kabak v. Thor Power Tool Co.,46 holding that the tort liability
of an employer to an employee for a work-related injury was
determined by the law of the state where the employer has
taken out workers' compensation to cover the particular em-
ployee. Other cases involving this fact-law pattern have
reached the same result." As one court has put it, "[tihe place
of the employer's benefits coverage is the single most impor-
tant factor in determining which state's workers' compensation
law to apply."48
Relating the results of these cases to the ninth "rule of
choice of law," this "rule of choice of law" may thus be stated
as follows:
41 Id. at 324.
44 497 N.E.2d 814 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
"5 See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
46 245 N.E.2d 596 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969).
'4 See, e.g., Moore v. The Wausau Club, 777 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (em-
ployee of Illinois orchestra brought tort action against Wisconsin club where em-
ployee was injured; Illinois law, under which employee received workers' compensa-
tion, but under which employer was subject to contribution, applied); Lewis v.
Chemetron Corp., 448 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (injured employee brought
action in Pennsylvania against Pennsylvania defendant for injuries caused in work-
related accident in Ohio; law of Ohio, under which plaintiff had received workers'
compensation, and under which employer was immunized from contribution, ap-
plied to immunize employer from contribution liability); Roy v. Star Chopper Co.,
442 F. Supp. 1010 (D.R.I. 1977) (employee of Rhode Island corporation with its
principal place of business in Massachusetts injured in Massachusetts and received
workers' compensation there; Massachusetts law immunizing employer against tort
indemnity claim, applied). See also Barry v. Baker Elec. Co-Op., Inc., 354 N.W.2d
666 (N.D. 1984), in which the forum applied its own law on this issue to immu-
nize the forum employer from liability for contribution. A contrary result was
reached in Barringer v. State, 727 P.2d 1222 (Idaho 1986), in which the Idaho
court applied Idaho law to allow the state to recover contribution against the
Washington employer of a Washington employee who was killed in an accident in
Idaho, and whose beneficiaries successfully maintained a negligence action against
the state based on the negligent design and construction of a runaway truck
ramp.
48 Moore, 777 F. Supp. at 621.
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The tort liability of an employee who is covered by workers' com-
pensation and the liability of the employer for contribution to a
third-party tortfeasor in a claim involving that employee is deter-
mined by the law of the state where the employer has taken out
workers' compensation to cover the particular employee.49
II. THE COONEY DECISION: PARTY EXPECTATIONS AND THE
NINTH "RULE OF CHOICE OF LAW"
Cooney was a typical employee products liability case
brought by the injured employee against the manufacturer of
the product that allegedly caused the injury. Cooney, a resi-
dent of Missouri, was injured there in 1978 while cleaning a
machine used to shape large pieces of metal. The machine had
been manufactured in New York in 1957 or 1958 by Kling
Brothers, Inc. (succeeded in interest by Hill Acme Co.), and in
1958 it was sold to a New York company, American Standard,
Inc., through New York sales agent, Osgood Machinery, Inc.,
which assisted American Standard in the setup and initial
operation of the machine. The machine next surfaced in 1969,
when Crouse Company, a New York company which had some-
how obtained the machine, sold it to Cooney's employer, Paul
Mueller Company. Mueller installed the machine in its Missou-
ri plant and subsequently modified it by adding a foot switch.
Cooney's injury occurred when he was unable to reach the foot
switch in time to stop the machine.
Cooney filed for and received workers' compensation bene-
fits from Mueller under Missouri law. Under Missouri law,
Mueller was thereby released from any tort liability to Cooney
or to a third party. As is typical in such cases, Cooney brought
a products liability action against Osgood-the machine's ini-
tial sales agent-in a New York state court.50 Osgood then
brought a third-party action seeking contribution against
Mueller, American Standard and Hill Acme. Mueller, in reli-
ance on Missouri law immunizing it from contribution to third
parties for this work-related injury, moved for summary judg-
ment dismissing Osgood's third-party complaint. Under New
York law, Mueller would remain liable to Osgood for contribu-
" For original ninth "rule of choice law," see Sedler, supra note 11, at 1039.
o Osgood apparently was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Missouri.
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tion. The trial court held that New York law should apply, but
its decision was unanimously reversed by the New York Appel-
late Division, which dismissed the third-party complaint and
all cross-claims against Mueller.51 The New York Court of Ap-
peals unanimously affirmed the decision of the Appellate Divi-
sion.52
In retrospect, then, Cooney should have been an easy case
for the New York Court of Appeals to decide, and perhaps it
was. The Court of Appeals was unanimous in its decision, and
the result in Cooney is consistent with the results that other
courts have reached when dealing with this fact-law pattern,
as reflected in the restated ninth "rule of choice of law." In-
deed, Cooney demonstrates very clearly the operation of "rules
of choice of law" in conflicts torts cases, and supports my sub-
mission that in conflicts torts cases, the courts have reached
fairly uniform results regardless of which "modern" approach
to choice of law the courts are purportedly following. What I
am suggesting, then, is that the New York Court of Appeals
"knew" the result that it wanted to reach in Cooney and then
proceeded to reach that result. And although the court made
no reference to the decisions of the other courts in the cases
presenting this fact-law pattern, it nevertheless reached the
same result as they did. Hence, the decision supports the sub-
mission that there are indeed "rules of choice of law" in con-
flicts torts cases.53
5 Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 179 A.D.2d 240, 582 N.Y.S.2d 873 (4th Dep't
1992).
52 Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 66, 70, 612 N.E.2d 277, 279, 595
N.Y.S.2d 919, 921 (1993).
" I place great emphasis on the results that the courts reach in the actual
conflicts cases coming before them for decision, because, as stated previously, I
maintain that the function of a court in a conflicts case is to reach results that
are functionally sound and fair to the parties. And it is from these results that
"rules of choice of law" in conflicts torts cases have emerged. In my opinion, con-
flicts commentators-and this is true of commentators in other areas of law as
well-tend to be much too concerned with and critical of the opinions that courts
render and the explanations that they give for their decisions in a particular case.
This is not to say that the courts' opinions and the explanations for their deci-
sions are not important. The opinions serve as precedent, and the rationale of a
court's decision must be relied on by lawyers and by lower courts as they respec-
tively litigate and try to resolve future cases. Nonetheless, I maintain that in
practice a court is much more concerned about the result that it reaches than
about the precise rationale by which it arrives at that result. Courts have to de-
cide many cases and to write many opinions supporting their decisions. Judicial
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If the New York Court of Appeals had been consistently
applying judicial method in conflicts torts cases, then reaching
the result that it wanted to reach in Cooney would have been
an easy matter doctrinally. The court simply could have in-
voked the considerations of policy and fairness reflected in the
ninth "rule of choice of law." The most relevant policy consider-
ations here are those relating to workers' compensation. In all
of the states, workers' compensation is the primary means of
providing compensation for work-related injuries, and the state
where the employer has taken out workers' compensation to
cover the particular employee has a strong interest in applying
its law to implement the workers' compensation policy reflect-
ed in that law. And as regards fairness, the employer who has
taken out workers' compensation to cover a particular employ-
ee should be entitled to rely on the law of the state where that
workers' compensation coverage has been taken out immuniz-
ing it from tort liability to that employee. The workers' com-
pensation policy of that state and the employer's reliance on
that state's law immunizing it from tort liability are under-
mined if another state allows the employee to maintain a tort
action or a third party to maintain a contribution action
against the employer. Thus, a functionally sound and fair re-
sult in the fact-law pattern presented here is achieved by hold-
ing that the tort liability of the employer, both directly and
indirectly by way of contribution, is determined by the law of
the state where the employer has taken out workers' compen-
sation to cover the particular employee.
It is evident that these were the considerations that in fact
motivated the New York Court of Appeals in Cooney to hold
that Missouri law applied on the issue of the Missouri
employer's liability for contribution to the third party
tortfeasor. Recognizing that both Missouri and New York had
an interest in applying their conflicting laws in this case, the
court stated that, "if neither [interest] can be accommodated
without substantially impairing the other, [the court must
opinions should not be expected to meet the "academic standards" of a law review
article, and it is for this reason that I maintain that the brush of academic criti-
cism should be lightly applied to judicial opinions. If the court has reached a re-
sult that is functionally sound and fair to the parties, it should not be criticized
too harshly if its opinion is not a "textbook model of academic analysis."
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find] some other sound basis for resolving the impasse."' The
court found this "other sound basis" in the matter of party
expectations or, more specifically, in the entitlement of the
Missouri employer to rely on Missouri workers' compensation
law to determine its tort liability to the employee and to the
third-party tortfeasors. As the court stated, "In view of the
unambiguous statutory language barring third party liabili-
ty... Mueller [the Missouri employer] could hardly have ex-
pected to be haled before a New York court to respond in dam-
ages for an accident to a Missouri employee at a Missouri
plant."" The court went on to say that the New York manu-
facturer "could have had no reasonable expectation that contri-
bution would be available in a products liability action arising
out of the sale of industrial equipment," both because its con-
nection with the product occurred some years before New York
recognized full contribution among joint tortfeasors, and be-
cause even under present New York law, the entitlement to
contribution was not "foolproof." That is to say, that in some
cases New York jurisdiction could not be obtained over the
other tortfeasor or the other tortfeasor might be insolvent.56
Thus, the court concluded: "In sum, we conclude that Missouri
law should apply because, although the interests of the respec-
tive jurisdictions are irreconcilable, the accident occurred in
Missouri, and unavailability of contribution would more closely
accord with the reasonable expectations of both parties in
conducting their business affairs."57
As I have stated previously, in evaluating the soundness of
a court's decision in a conflicts case, I maintain that the focus
should be on the result that the court reaches rather than on
the precise rationale it gives for reaching that result.58 I do
not think that the purported "expectations" of the New York
manufacturer really played an important part in the decision
in Cooney.59 That is, I do not think that the result would have
been different if the product had been manufactured at a time
when New York law fully recognized contribution, and since
" Cooney, 81 N.Y.2d at 74, 612 N.E.2d at 282, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
" Id. at 77, 612 N.E.2d at 284, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
56 Id.
57 Id.
" See Sedler, New Critics, supra note 1, at 597-99.
59 Id.
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New York law now does fully recognize contribution, it should
not matter that entitlement to contribution is not "foolproof." I
would submit that it was the expectations of the Missouri
employer that were significant in Cooney, coupled with the fact
that the employer's immunity from contribution is an integral
part of the Missouri workers' compensation policy that was
involved in this Missouri work-related injury.
The application of the law of the state where the employer
has taken out workers' compensation covering the particular
employee to determine the employer's liability for contribution
clearly illustrates the operation of fairness considerations in
the choice-of-law process. As I have pointed out previously,
fairness to the parties is an independent choice-of-law consid-
eration." Even where the application of the forum's law is not
so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process, as Cooney
indicates the forum will be reluctant to apply its own law,
despite a real interest in doing so, if the application of its law
will produce some unfairness to the party against whom it is
being applied.6 In Cooney, the application of New York's law
to impose liability for contribution on Mueller, the Missouri
employer, would not have been so fundamentally unfair as to
violate due process. The Missouri employer had purchased the
machine from a New York manufacturer, and in a general
sense could foresee the application of New York law on the
issue of its liability for contribution to the New York manufac-
turer. However, it could be subject to a contribution claim by
the New York manufacturer only if the following factors co-
alesced: (1) the machine was defective and caused a work-relat-
ed injury to the employer's Missouri employee; (2) its Missouri
employee sued the manufacturer in New York; and (3) the
manufacturer sought to join the Missouri employer in order to
obtain contribution from it in New York, which it could do
because the employer was doing unrelated business in New
York.62
See id. at 613.
" Id.
62 In Cooney, the New York Court of Appeals specifically considered whether
the application of New York's contribution law to Mueller would be unconstitution-
al, and held that it would not be, noting that the machine was manufactured in
New York and that Mueller did unrelated business there. 81 N.Y.2d at 72, 612
N.E.2d at 280, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
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As we have seen in the other cases presenting this particu-
lar issue, the courts are of the view that the employer should
be able to rely on the law of the state where it has taken out
workers' compensation covering the particular employee to
determine its potential tort liability for work-related inju-
ries.63 Depending on the nature of its insurance coverage, it is
possible that the employer would not be insured for tort liabili-
ty for work-related injuries to employees who were already
insured under its workers' compensation coverage. In any
event, because the law of that state immunizes the employer
from contribution for work-related injuries, the employer
should not be expected to insure against the rare circumstance
in which it might be held liable for contribution in the
employee's action against a third-party tortfeasor.
I have thus explained the holding in Cooney in terms of
fairness. New York would not apply its own law on the issue of
contribution in this case, because the application of New York
law on this issue would produce some unfairness to the Missou-
ri employer, who was entitled to rely on the law of Missouri,
where it had taken out workers' compensation coverage for
that employee, and which in turn immunized it from liability
for contribution to a third-party tortfeasor. Again, this is the
result that the other courts have reached when presented with
this situation, as reflected in the redrawn ninth "rule of choice
of law:" the liability of an employer for contribution to a third-
party tortfeasor in a suit arising out of a work-related injury is
determined by the law of the state where the employer has
taken out workers' compensation covering the particular em-
ployee. Clearly, in Cooney, the New York Court of Appeals
reached a result that is functionally sound and fair to the parties.'
See supra notes 38-40.
" The result in Cooney may be compared to and is fully consistent with the
result reached by a New York federal court in Gregory v. Garrett Corp., 578 F.
Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (applying New York law), a case presenting a somewhat
different fact-law pattern and a very different factual situation than Cooney. That
case arose out of the crash of a corporate aircraft in New York. The aircraft was
owned and operated by a New York corporation (TGA), which had been estab-
lished as a wholly-owned subsidiary by a Connecticut corporation (TG), in order to
maintain a fleet of readily available corporate aircraft for TG while complying with
Federal Aviation Agency ownership requirements. All eight persons killed in the
crash were employees of TG, TGA or both. Id. The survivors of the six Connecti-
cut residents obtained workers' compensation under North Carolina law, and the
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III. A CONCLUDING THOUGHT: WHAT ABOUT THE NEUMEIER
RULES?
As I have said, it is my submission that in analyzing con-
flicts cases, the emphasis should be on the soundness of the
result that a court reaches, and if the result is functionally
sound and fair to the parties, we should not be too concerned
about the explanation that the court gives for reaching that
result. Since the New York Court of Appeals clearly reached a
result in Cooney that is functionally sound and fair to the
parties, I should perhaps leave well enough alone and, at this
point, end my commentary about the case. But I am left with a
nagging question that is prompted by the New York Court of
Appeals' treatment of the Neumeier rules in Cooney.
In Cooney, the New York Court of Appeals was confronted
with the approach that it had adopted to choice of law in inter-
state accident cases, an approach that is an amalgam of inter-
est analysis and what may be called "narrow, policy-centered"
rules. Although New York generally follows interest analysis,
its application of the interest analysis approach in interstate
accident cases is qualified by the Neumeier rules. Under the
first Neumeier rule, when both the plaintiff and defendant are
from the same state, the law of that state applies. Under the
second and third Neumeier rules, when the plaintiff and defen-
survivors of the two North Carolina residents obtained workers' compensation
under North Carolina law. Id. at 876. The survivors then brought products liabili-
ty actions against a number of entities that had designed, manufactured and
worked on the aircraft. The defendants sought to obtain contribution against TG
and TGA. Some of the survivors of the TG employees also sought to maintain a
tort action against TGA.
The court held that the law of Connecticut and North Carolina determined
whether the survivors could maintain a tort action against TGA. However, the
court held that on the issue of whether the product liability defendants could
obtain contribution against TG and TGA, New York law allowing contribution
applied instead of Connecticut and North Carolina law, which did not. The court
based its decision on the fact that the accident occurred in New York; the alleged-
ly negligent conduct of TGA occurred in New York; most of the product liability
defendants resided in New York; the relationships between all of parties were
centered in New York; and, New York was TGA's principal place of business. The
court also held that under the second Neumeier rule, New York law would apply,
since the accident occurred there. Id. at 881. Under the "protection of reasonable
expectations" analysis subsequently employed by the New York Court of Appeals
in Cooney, New York law was properly applied on the contribution issue in this
case, because of the "massing of contacts" in New York.
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dant are from different states-both the true conflict and the
unprovided-for case-the law of the state where the accident
occurs generally applies.65 In Cooney, the New York Court of
Appeals "faithfully" applied its stated approach to choice of
law. It first found that this case presented a true conflict: Mis-
souri had a real interest in applying its law protecting the
employer from contribution, while New York likewise had a
real interest in applying its law permitting contribution to
enable the New York manufacturer to obtain contribution from
the Missouri employer.66 Because the case presented a true
conflict, and because the parties were from different states, as
the court recognized, the second Neumeier rule would call for
the application of Missouri law on the issue of the New York
manufacturer's entitlement to contribution against the Missou-
ri employer.6 7
But the New York Court of Appeals was unwilling to re-
solve this true conflict by applying the "place of the accident
tiebreaker," as would be required under the second Neumeier
rule. The court stated that the rationale for the "place of the
accident tiebreaker" was that, "ordinarily it is the place with
which both parties have voluntarily associated."6' Here, how-
ever, the New York manufacturer did not directly sell the ma-
chine to the Missouri employer, and as the court noted, "[tihe
record establishes that Osgood [the New York manufacturer]
was not in the business of distributing goods nationwide, but
limited its activities to New York and parts of Pennsylvania,
and thus Osgood may not have reasonably anticipated becom-
ing embroiled in litigation with a Missouri employer."69 The
New York Court of Appeals then said that it would base its
decision on "the protection of reasonable expectations," and
applied Missouri law on this basis.7"
I have been a harsh critic of the Neumeier rules.7' I have
contended that the Neumeier rules, although purportedly nar-
row and policy-based, suffer from the vice of all choice-of-law
" See Cooney, 81 N.Y.2d at 74, 612 N.E.2d at 281-82, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 923-24.
66 Id. at 75-77, 612 N.E.2d at 282-83, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 924-25.




7 See generally Sedler, supra note 12, at 131-37.
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rules: they were formulated a priori and then must be applied
to the facts of particular cases.v2 I have also demonstrated
that in practice, the application of the Neumeier rules may
produce functionally unsound results in particular cases.73
It is the second Neumeier rule that I find the most trou-
bling. Not only was the rule not based on the decisions of the
New York Court of Appeals in prior cases, but, to the contrary,
it is inconsistent with the result reached in the pre-Neumeier
case of Miller v. Miller.74 There, a New York resident was
killed in Maine in an accident with a Maine defendant. When
the Maine defendant moved to New York, the decedent's bene-
ficiaries brought a wrongful death action against him there. At
that time, Maine law limited recovery of damages for wrongful
death, while New York law did not. In this true conflict situa-
tion,7" New York applied its own law allowing recovery. The
second Neumeier rule, if properly followed, would require the
overruling of Miller. It would also require the overruling of
another pre-Neumeier decision of the New York Court of Ap-
72 Id. at 132-37.
" For example, where a plaintiff and a defendant from different recovery
states are involved in an accident in a non-recovery state, the case presents a
false conflict, and under the second "rule of choice of law," recovery will be al-
lowed. See Sedler, supra note 11, at 1034. Moreover, under the rationale of the
first Neumeier rule, recovery should be allowed. But the case by its terms comes
within the third Neumeier rule. When faced with such a situation in Chila v.
Owens, 348 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (applying New York law), the court cor-
rectly treated the case as presenting a false conflict and applied the first Neumeier
rule. However, in Rogers v. U-Haul Co., 41 A.D.2d 834, 342 N.Y.S.2d 158 (2d
Dep't 1973), the Appellate Division was faced with the situation of an Alabama
resident killed in a Pennsylvania accident as a result of the negligence of a New
York driver operating a vehicle owned by U-Haul, a nationwide concern doing
substantial business in New York. U-Haul would be considered a New York defen-
dant for purposes of the Neumeier rules. Under New York law, U-Haul would be
vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver, but under Pennsylvania law, it
would not be. The court did not consider whether U-Haul would be vicariously
liable under the law of Alabama, where the victim resided. Since the parties were
from different states, the court applied the third Neumeier rule, and held that
Pennsylvania law, barring recovery, applied. However, if Alabama law would have
imposed vicarious liability on U-Haul, this case would have presented a false con-
flict, and liability should have been imposed.
7' 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
" Maine's interest in applying its law limiting damages recoverable for wrong-
ful death in this case was not affected by the nominal defendant's post-transaction
move to New York, since the accident would still be charged to the insurer's
Maine loss experience, and Maine would still have a real interest in having its
law applied in order to limit recovery.
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peals, Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,76 where the New
York Court of Appeals refused on "public policy" grounds to
apply Massachusetts law limiting recovery for wrongful death
in a case involving a New York victim and a Massachusetts
airline, with the fatal crash occurring in Massachusetts."
In the years since Neumeier was decided, the New York
Court of Appeals has not been directly confronted with a case
presenting the issue of whether the law of the state of injury
will be applied to deny or limit the recovery of a New York
accident victim injured or killed by a non-recovery state de-
fendant in the defendant's home state. The Second Circuit,
however, has been faced with a case presenting this issue in
regard to limitations on wrongful death, and has held that
notwithstanding the Neumeier rules, New York law would
apply its own law in this situation, because it would be against
New York's "public policy" to limit wrongful death recovery for
a New York victim. 8 The Second Circuit has also held that
where a New York employee of a New York employer was
76 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 380, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
" At this time New York was following the "place of the wrong" rule of the
traditional approach. Under the proper application of the methodology of the tradi-
tional approach, a court would be justified in refusing to enforce a claim existing
under the law of the "place of the wrong," but not in refusing to enforce a defense
existing under that state's law. Thus, in Kilberg, New York was using "public
policy" as a manipulative technique to bring about the application of New York
law on the issue of damages recoverable for wrongful death. The application of
New York law on this issue was fully foreseeable to the defendant, since it did
extensive business in New York, where the fatal flight originated.
In Cooney, the New York manufacturer argued that it would be against New
York's "public policy" to apply Missouri law on the issue of contribution. The man-
ufacturer relied on another case where the New York courts had used "public
policy" as a manipulative technique to bring about the effective application of New
York law. In that case, Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1928), two
New York spouses were involved in an automobile accident in Connecticut. At that
time, New York law recognized spousal immunity, while Connecticut law did not.
In a suit in New York, the New York court held that it would be against New
York's "public policy" to allow the suit between spouses, as permitted by Connecti-
cut law. In Cooney, the New York Court of Appeals held that there was no "public
policy" objection to applying Missouri law on the issue of the employer's liability
for contribution to the New York manufacturer. Cooney v. Osgood Mach., Inc., 81
N.Y.2d 66, 79, 612 N.E.2d 277, 285, 595 N.Y.S.2d 919, 925 (1993).
78 Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973). The district court in War-
ren held that the second Neumeier rule did not apply to questions of charitable
immunity either, so that New York law would apply to allow recovery to the bene-
ficiaries of the New York victim against the Massachusetts charity, although the
fatal injury occurred in Massachusetts. 374 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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killed while temporarily working on a project in Virginia due
to the negligence of an employee of another company working
on the project, New York workers' compensation law (which
did not consider the two employees to be in the "same employ"
for workers' compensation purposes) rather than Virginia law
applied, thus allowing a tort action against the other company.
The Second Circuit held that, notwithstanding the Neumeier
rules, New York would apply its own law in this case on "pub-
lic policy" grounds.79
In Cooney, the New York Court of Appeals specifically
recognized that the second Neumeier rule had adopted a "place
of injury" test for interstate accident cases presenting the true
conflict. The court was unwilling to use the Neumeier rules to
resolve the true conflict in that case, because the New York
manufacturer "did nothing to affiliate itself with Missouri.""
This observation would not apply in a case like Miller, since
the New York decedent was driving in Maine, or in Kilberg,
since the fatal accident occurred during a flight to Massachu-
setts. Nonetheless, the New York Court of Appeals long ago
abandoned the "place of injury" rule in Babcock,"' where two
New Yorkers were involved in an accident in a non-recovery
state, and has also held that the law of the parties' home state
rather than New York applies when two non-residents are
involved in an accident in New York." Therefore, it may be
queried why New York should look to the law of the "place of
injury" as a viable means of resolving a true conflict, especially
when, as in Miller and Kilberg, doing so would require the
court to sacrifice New York's own policies and interests. To put
"' O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978). I do not
consider the result in this case to be inconsistent with the ninth "rule of choice of
law," because the New York victim was not doing work for the company whose
employee had caused the fatal injury. Virginia had a broad definition of what
employees were in the "same employ" for purposes of its workers' compensation
law, which conflicted with New York's narrower definition of "same employ." In
this circumstance, the policy and fairness concerns which are at the basis of the
ninth "rule of choice of law" would not seem to be implicated if the Virginia com-
pany did not obtain the benefit of Virginia law to avoid liability to the New York
victim, who was not in any way doing any work for that company.
8' 51 N.Y.2d at 75, 612 N.E.2d at 283, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
81 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).




it another way, perhaps the New York Court of Appeals, when
and if it is faced with this situation, will be willing to consider
anew whether New York, which generally follows interest
analysis, should sacrifice New York's policy and interest in a
true conflict situation, merely because the accident occurred in
another state. In any event, since, the New York Court of Ap-
peals did not enthusiastically embrace the second Neumeier
rule in Cooney, there is at least the possibility that the court
will reconsider the utility of that rule when it is sought to be
applied in a true conflict situation, such as Miller or Kilberg,
where, unlike Cooney, there are no fairness considerations that
would dictate the displacement of New York law.
But it will be time enough for the New York Court of Ap-
peals to reconsider this question when and if such a case aris-
es. In Cooney, the New York Court of Appeals dealt with the
issue at hand, and applying considerations of policy and fair-
ness, reached a result that is functionally sound and fair to the
parties. In so doing, it performed the proper function of a court
in a conflicts case, and regardless of whether the court so in-
tended, its decision in Cooney serves as a very good example of
the operation of judicial method in conflicts torts cases.
[Vol. 59: 13231350
